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Abstract This paper describes new network steganography
methods that utilize mechanisms for handling oversized IP
packets: IP fragmentation, PMTUD (Path MTU Discovery)
and PLPMTUD (Packetization Layer Path MTU Discov-
ery). In particular, for these mechanisms we propose two
new steganographic methods and three extensions of exist-
ing ones. We present how mentioned mechanisms can be
used to enable hidden communication for both versions of IP
protocol: 4 and 6 and how they can be detected. Results for
experimental evaluation of IP fragmentation steganographic
methods are also enclosed in this paper.
Keywords Network steganography · IP fragmentation ·
PMTUD · PLPMTUD
1 Introduction
Steganographic methods hide secret data in users’ normal
data transmissions and in ideal situation hidden information
and existence of hidden communication cannot be detected
by third parties. Various steganographic methods have been
proposed and analyzed, e.g. [1–4]. They may be seen as a
threat to network security as they may be used as a tool
to cause for example confidential information leakage. That
is why it is important to identify potential possibilities for
covert communication, because knowledge of the informa-
tion hiding procedure can be used to develop countermea-
sures.
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Both versions of IP protocol 4 [5] and 6 [9] were de-
signed to be used on various transmission links. The max-
imum length of an IP packet is 64 kB but on most trans-
mission links maximum packet length is smaller. This lim-
ited value characteristic for the specific link is called a MTU
(Maximum Transmission Unit). MTU depends on the type
of the transmission link e.g. for Ethernet—1500, wireless
IEEE 802.11—2300 and PPP (Point to Point Protocol)—
296 bytes.
There are two possibilities to transmit large IP packet
through an end-to-end path that consists of links with dif-
ferent MTUs:
• Permit to divide oversized packet to smaller ones. To
achieve this mechanism called IP fragmentation [5] has
been standardized.
• Do not allow packet fragmentation and adjust IP packet
size to so called PMTU (Path MTU)—the smallest, ac-
ceptable MTU along the entire end-to-end path. For this
purpose two methods have been proposed PMTUD (Path
MTU Discovery) [6] for IPv4 and [7] for IPv6 and PLPM-
TUD (Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery) [8],
which is enhancement of previous method for both ver-
sions of IP protocol.
Mechanisms for handling oversized packets like IP frag-
mentation, PMTUD or PLPMTUD are needed and used in
network scenarios where in the end-to-end path intermedi-
ate links have smaller MTUs than the MTU of the end links.
Below typical network scenarios that require dealing with
oversized packets are listed:
• Usage of various tunneling protocols like GRE (Generic
Routing Encapsulation), IPSec (IP Security), and L2TP
(Layer Two Tunneling Protocol) which add headers and
trailers thus reduce effective MTU.
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• Using PPPoE (Point to Point Protocol over Ethernet) with
ADSL (Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line). PPPoE has
8 bytes header thus it reduces the effective MTU of the
Ethernet to 1492 bytes.
• Using MPLS over Ethernet.
• Connections between endpoints in Token Ring or FDDI
networks, which have an Ethernet link between them
(with lower MTU) and other similar cases.
This work is extension of the previous authors’ work [13].
The objectives of this paper are to:
• Describe mechanisms used to handle oversized packets in
IPv4 and IPv6 networks.
• Present exiting network steganography methods that uti-
lize these mechanisms.
• Propose two new steganographic methods and three ex-
tensions of existing ones All presented steganographic
methods may be applied to both versions of IP protocol
(4 and 6). Additionally, we show how IP fragmentation
simplifies usage of methods that modify time relations be-
tween the packets.
• Present the experimental evaluation of steganographic
bandwidth for IP fragmentation network steganography
methods.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes ex-
isting mechanisms for handling oversized packets for IPv4
and IPv6 protocols. In Sect. 3 existing network steganog-
raphy methods that utilize these mechanism are presented.
Section 4 includes detailed description of new informa-
tion hiding methods and their potential detection. Section 5
presents experimental results for IP fragmentation stegano-
graphic methods. Section 6 concludes our work.
2 Overview of mechanism for handling oversized IP
packets
2.1 IP fragmentation
To accommodate MTU differences on links in end-to-end
path in IP fragmentation, intermediate nodes are allowed to
fragment oversized packets to smaller ones. Then receiver
or some other network node (e.g. router) is responsible for
reassembling the fragments back into the original IP packet.
IP fragmentation mechanism involves using the follow-
ing fields of the IPv4 header (Fig. 1): Identification, Frag-
ment Offset fields, along with the MF (More Fragments) and
DF (Don’t fragment) flags. It also needs to adjust values in
Total Length and Header Checksum fields for each fragment
to represent correct values. The above header fields are used
as follows:
• Identification (16 bits) is a value assigned by the sender to
each IP packet to enable correct reassembling of the frag-
ments (each fragment has the same Identification value).
Fig. 1 The IPv4 protocol header (bolded are fields used by IP frag-
mentation)
Fig. 2 IPv6 Fragment header extension
• Fragment Offset (13 bits) indicates which part of the orig-
inal packet fragment carries.
• Flags field (3 bits) contains control flags. Bit ‘0’ is re-
served and is always set to 0. Bit ‘1’ is the DF flag—if
set to 0 fragmentation can occur; if set to 1 fragmenta-
tion is not possible. Bit ‘2’ is the MF flag—if set to 0 and
Fragment Offset is different from 0, this denotes the pres-
ence of last fragment and if set to 1 more fragments are
expected to be received.
Similar mechanism is used in version 6 of IP protocol,
where Fragment extension header (Fig. 2) is used to per-
form fragmentation. What differs IPv6 from IPv4 fragmen-
tation is that it may only be performed by the sender and
reassembly process have to take place only in the receiver
and not in some intermediate node.
The example of the IP packet fragmentation for IPv4
is presented in Table 1. Original packet which size is
5140 bytes is divided into four fragments of maximum
1500 bytes.
There are several issues that make IP Fragmentation in
IPv4 networks undesirable because it lowers the efficiency
and reliability of communication. Fragmentation causes se-
rious overhead for the receiver because while reassembling
the fragments the receiver must allocate memory for the ar-
riving fragments and after all of the fragments are received
they are put back into original IP packet. While it is not an
issue for a host as it has the time and memory resources to
devote to this task, reassembly may be very inefficient on
intermediate nodes (e.g. routers). Router is not able to deter-
mine the size of the original IP packet until the last fragment
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0 345 5140 0 0 0
IP Fragments
0–0 345 1500 0 1 0
0–1 345 1500 0 1 185
0–2 345 1500 0 1 370
0–3 345 700 0 0 555
is received, so while reassembling it must assign a large re-
ceiving buffer.
Another fragmentation issue involves handling dropped
fragments. If one fragment of an IP packet is dropped, then
the entire original IP packet must be resent (all fragments).
Firewalls and NATs (Network Address Translation) may
have trouble processing fragments correctly and in effect
drop them. If the IP fragments are out of order, a firewall
may block the non-initial fragments because they do not
carry the information that would match the packet filter. This
would mean that the original packet could not be reassem-
bled by the receiving host. Similar problem may occur with
NAT as it has problems with interpreting the IP fragment if
it comes out of order.
2.2 PMTUD (path MTU discovery)
PMTUD was standardized for IPv4 and published in 1990,
but it did not become widely deployed for the next few years.
Currently PMTUD is implemented in major operating sys-
tems (Windows, Unix, Linux)—in 2002 about 80–90% of
endpoints on the Internet were using it. As mentioned in the
introduction this mechanism was developed to avoid frag-
mentation in the path between the endpoints. Similar to IPv4
PMTUD mechanism was also developed and standardized
for IPv6 [7].
PMTUD is used to dynamically determine the lowest
MTU along the end-to-end path between packets sender and
receiver. Instead of fragmenting packet, an endpoint deter-
mines the largest possible size of the packet that can be
sent to a specific destination. An endpoint establishes the
correct packet size associated with a specific path by send-
ing packets with different sizes. Packets used by PTMUD
are called probe messages and they have DF flag set in the
IP protocol header. Their size is initially set to the senders
link MTU. While sender generates probes he/she responds
to possible ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) error
reports that indicate a low MTU is present along the con-
nection path. Sender receives a notification informing what
packet size will be suitable. The notifications are requested
by setting the DF flag in outgoing packets. For IPv4 the noti-
fications arrive as ICMP messages known as “Fragmentation
required, and DF flag set” (ICMP type 3, code 4), for IPv6
it is “Packet too big” message from ICMPv6 protocol [10].
PMTUD is working continually during connection because
the path between sender and receiver can changed (e.g. be-
cause of link failure).
The PMTUD example is illustrated in Fig. 3. Host A
sends packet to host B which size is set to 1500 bytes (de-
fault Ethernet MTU). The packet will be transmitted with
use of IPSec tunnel, which begins at first router. Because the
next link MTU is also 1500 bytes and IPSec adds 54 bytes
overhead then total packet size exceeds admissible MTU.
Thus the packet is dropped and ICMP message is sent back
to the host A with suitable MTU for the next link. Then
host A retries sending the packet by reducing its size to
1442 bytes to meet the limit, so packet can successfully tra-
verse through first router. However, the link after next router
has MTU of 1000 bytes so the packet is once again dropped
and ICMP message is sent in host A direction but it is fil-
tered out by first router. After the timeout expires host A
retransmits the packet and receives ICMP message which
Fig. 3 PMTUD example
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indicates necessity to decrease packet size to 942 bytes. This
last MTU value is then used to successfully exchange data
with host B.
It must be noted that there are security issues related with
using PMTUD. In particular, sometimes network adminis-
trators treat all ICMP traffic as dangerous and block it, dis-
abling possibility of using path MTU discovery. Other po-
tential issues for TCP protocol are described in [11].
2.3 PLPMTUD (packetization layer path MTU discovery)
To alleviate issues related with using ICMP traffic for PM-
TUD, enhancement called PLPMTUD was developed and
standardized in [8]. What differs PLPMTUD from PMTUD
is that receiving probes messages are validated at the trans-
port layer. It does not rely on ICMP or other messages from
the network, instead it learns about correct MTU by start-
ing with packets which size is relatively small and when
they get through with progressively larger ones. In particu-
lar, PLPMTUD uses a searching technique to determine op-
timal PMTU. Each probe narrows the MTU search range. It
may raise the lower limit on a successful probe receipt or
lower the upper limit if probe fails. The isolated loss of a
probe message is treated as an indication of an MTU limit
and transport layer protocol is permitted to retransmit any
missing data.
3 Related work
To authors best knowledge, there are no steganographic
methods proposed for PMTUD and PLPMTUD mecha-
nisms.
For IPv4 there are few existing methods that utilize IP
fragmentation mechanism and fields in IP header related to
it. Rowland [1] proposed multiplying each byte of the hid-
den data by 256 and inserts it directly into Identification
header field. Cauich et al. [14] described how to use Iden-
tification and Fragment Offset fields to carry hidden data
between intermediate nodes but under condition that the
packet is not fragmented. Additionally, in selected packet
reserved flag is used to mark packet so that the receiver can
distinguish between real and covert fragments. Murdoch et
al. [4] proposed transmitting hidden information by mod-
ulating the size of the fragments to match the hidden data
inserted into Fragment Offset field. Ahsan and Kundur [12]
proposed steganographic method that use IP fragmentation
fields. It utilizes high eight bits of the Identification to trans-
mit covert data and the low eight bits are generated ran-
domly. The same authors in [17] described a method that
uses DF flag as a covert data carrier. If the sender knows the
correct MTU for the end-to-end path to the receiver and is-
sues packets which size is less than MTU then DF can be set
to arbitrary values.
For IPv6 protocol Lucena et al. [15] identified four net-
work steganographic methods based on Fragment header
extension. Two methods use reserved fields to carry stegano-
gram and one next header field. Fourth steganographic
method is based on fake fragments insertion. In this case all
fields of the fragment header may be used for covert com-
munication. To avoid having inserted fragment included in
the reassembly process of the original IP packet, authors
propose two solutions: first is based on inserting an invalid
value in Identification field in Fragment extension header,
thus the receiver will drop such fragment, second—inserting
overlapping Fragment Offset value that causes data to be
overwritten during reassembly. Fake fragments carry hidden
data only in certain header fields.
4 Proposed methods: communication scenarios,
functioning and detection
Every steganographic method should be analyzed in terms
of steganographic bandwidth and risk of hidden commu-
nication disclosure. Steganographic bandwidth may be ex-
pressed by means of RBR (Raw Bit Rate), which is defined
as a total number of steganogram bits transmitted during one
time unit [bit/s] or equivalently by PRBR (Packet Raw Bit
Rate) which is defined as a total number of steganogram bits
transmitted in single packet used during the hidden commu-
nication process [bit/packet]. Some steganographic methods
are trivial to detect (e.g. those which simply modifies header
fields) but for others the steganalysis may be harder to per-
form. Thus, for each proposed steganographic solution po-
tential detection methods must be analyzed.
In general, there are four communication scenarios pos-
sible for network steganographic exchange. The first sce-
nario (1) in Fig. 4, is most common: the sender, who is also
a Steganogram Sender (SS) and the receiver, who is also
a Steganogram Receiver (SR) establish a connection while
Fig. 4 Hidden communication scenarios
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simultaneously exchanging steganograms. In the next three
scenarios (marked 2–4 in Fig. 4) only a part of the end-to-
end path is used for hidden communication as a result of
actions undertaken by intermediate nodes; the sender and/or
receiver are, in principle, unaware of the steganographic data
exchange.
Hidden communication scenarios presented above differ
in steganalysis, in particular, the scenario 4 is harder to de-
tect, because the network node which analyses traffic for
hidden communication called warden [20] is usually placed
at the edge of source or destination endpoints (sub)network.
4.1 IP fragmentation
For IP fragmentation mechanism we propose new stegano-
graphic method (F1) and two enhancements of the previ-
ously proposed ones (F2 and F3). Moreover, we also show
how IP fragmentation simplifies usage of existing stegano-
graphic methods that require transmitter-receiver synchro-
nization (F4–F6). Steganographic methods that may be used
for IP Fragmentation can be classified as presented in Fig. 5.
Each of presented methods may be utilized for IPv4 and
IPv6 protocols for each scenario from Fig. 4. However,
for IPv4 fragmentation, fragments reassembly may be per-
formed by intermediate nodes as well as by the sender and/or
receiver. This may limit the steganogram exchange only to
the fragmenting and assembling nodes. For IPv6 there is no
such limitation.
4.1.1 Steganographic method F1
In this method SS (Steganogram Sender) must be the source
of the fragmentation. SS inserts single bit of hidden data by
dividing original IP packet into the predefined number of
fragments. For example, if the number of fragments is even
then it means that binary “0” is transmitted and in other case
binary “1” (Fig. 6).
After reception of the fragments SR uses the number of
the fragments of each received IP packet to determine what
hidden data was sent.
Potential steganographic bandwidth for this method is
PRBR = 1 bit/packet.
Detection of this method may be hard to perform. Statis-
tical steganalysis based on number of fragments can be per-
formed to detect irregularities in number of the fragments.
The best method to make hidden communication unavail-
able is to reassembly original IP packet in the intermediate
node responsible for detecting steganographic communica-
tion (warden [20]), then refragment it randomly and send to
the receiver.
After reception of the fragments SR uses the number of
the fragments of each received IP packet to determine what
hidden data was sent.
Fig. 5 Classification of IP Fragmentation steganographic methods
Fig. 6 F1 steganographic method example
Potential steganographic bandwidth for this method is
PRBR = 1 bit/packet.
Detection of this method may be hard to perform. Statis-
tical steganalysis based on number of fragments can be per-
formed to detect irregularities in number of the fragments.
The best method to make hidden communication unavail-
able is to reassembly original IP packet in the intermediate
node responsible for detecting steganographic communica-
tion (warden [20]), then refragment it randomly and send to
the receiver.
4.1.2 Steganographic method F2
The main idea of this method is to divide a packet into frag-
ments and insert hidden information by modulating the val-
ues that are inserted into Fragment Offset field. As men-
tioned in Sect. 3, Murdoch et al. [4] proposed inserting
steganogram directly into Fragment Offset field and mod-
ulate the size of the fragment to match this value. Such ap-
proach can cause high irregularities in fragments sizes which
may be easily detected. We propose enhancement of this
method which has lower steganographic bandwidth but is
harder to detect.
F2 method works as follows. SS must be the source of
the fragmentation. SS inserts single bit of hidden data by
intentionally modulating the size of each fragment of the
original packet in order to obtain fixed values in Fragment
Offset field. For example, even offset means transmitting bi-
nary “1”, odd offset—binary “0”. Similar method may be
used with total length of the packet as the sum of the digits
of packet size may be modulated to be even or odd.
“Steganographic” fragmentation of the exemplary IP
packet which was introduced in Table 1 is presented in Ta-
ble 2.
After successful reception of the fragments SR extracts
hidden data based on the values from Fragment Offset field.
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0–0 345 1300 0 1 0 –
0–1 345 1340 0 1 160 1
0–2 345 1340 0 1 325 0
0–3 345 1220 0 0 490 1
Steganographic bandwidth for this method is PRBR =
NF −1 [bit/packet], where NF denotes number of fragments
of the packet.
Steganalysis in case of F2 is harder than in case of
method proposed by Murdoch, but hidden communication
still can be uncovered, because usually all the fragments ex-
cept last one have equal sizes (see Table 1). Thus, if there
are any irregularities in fragments sizes, then steganographic
communication may be uncovered. However, this method
may be further improved, so the detection is more difficult
to perform. We may influence the size of the fragments in
such a manner that all fragments except last one would have
the same length and the value in Fragment Offset field in last
fragment is modulated to achieve even or odd value. In this
case the hidden communication may not be detected at all as
this fragmented packet will be similar to other ones.
Steganographic bandwidth for this improved method will
be lower than for above method and will be equal PRBR = 1
bit/packet.
Detection of this method may be hard to perform. Statisti-
cal steganalysis based on fragments sizes can be performed
to detect irregularities. The best method to make the hid-
den communication unavailable is the same as in case of
method F1.
4.1.3 Steganographic method F3
Proposed method is enhancement of Lucena et al. [15] work
for IPv6 fragmentation where they proposed to generate fake
fragments. As mentioned in Sect. 3 two solutions to distin-
guish fake fragments from the legitimate were presented—
first is based on inserting an invalid value in Identification
field in Fragment extension header, second—inserting over-
lapping Fragment Offset value that causes data to be over-
written during reassembly. Fake fragments carry hidden data
only in certain header fields. However, described methods
may be easy to uncover because the warden can monitor
all the fragments sent and determine potential anomalies
like overlapping offsets or single, unrelated fragments. Our
proposition is to use legitimate fragment with steganogram
inserted into payload for higher steganographic bandwidth
and harder detection.
F3 method works as follows. SS must be the source
of the fragmentation. SS while dividing the packet, inserts
steganogram instead of inserting user data into the payload
of selected fragment. The problem with such approach is to
properly mark fragments used for hidden communication so
the receiver can extract it in a way that will not interfere with
reassembly process. We propose the following procedure to
make the selected fragments distinguishable from others yet
hard to detect. Let us assume that sender and receiver share
secret Steg-Key (SK). For each fragment chosen for stegano-
graphic communication the following hash function (H ) is
used to calculate Identifying Sequence (IS):
IS = H(SK||Fragment Offset||Identification) (4.1)
where Fragment Offset and Identification denote values
from these IP fragment header fields and || bits concatena-
tion function. For every fragment used for hidden commu-
nications the resulting IS will have different value due to
the changing values in Fragment Offset. All IS bits or only
selected ones are distributed across payload field in prede-
fined manner. Thus, for each fragment the receiver based on
SK and values from the IP header can calculate appropri-
ate IS and checks if it contains steganogram or user data.
If the verification is successful then the rest of the payload
is considered as hidden data and extracted. Then SR does
not utilize this fragment in reassembly process of original
IP packet.
Steganographic bandwidth for this method may be ex-
pressed as
PRBR = NF · FS [bits/packet] (4.2)
where NF denotes number of fragments and FS the size of
the fragment payload.
Figure 7 illustrates example of the proposed stegano-
graphic method. IP packet with ID 345 is divided into four
fragments (F1–F4). Fragment F2 is used for steganographic
purposes, so inside its payload steganogram is inserted to-
gether with correct IS. Values in Fragment Offset and Iden-
tification remain the same as in other legitimate fragments.
While reassembling original packet, receiver merges pay-
loads P1, P2 and P3, omits fragment F2 and use it only to
extract steganogram.
Method F3 is hard to detect because legitimate fragments
are used as hidden data carriers. The best method to make
the hidden communication unavailable is the same as in case
of methods F1 and F2.
4.1.4 Steganographic methods F4–F6
Fragments that are created during fragmentation process
may be treated as numbered stream of the packets, because
Identification and Fragment Offset fields uniquely identify
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Fig. 7 F3 steganographic method example (H—header, P —payload)
each piece and allow their correct placement during re-
assembly process. That is why, for IP fragmentation mecha-
nism existing network steganographic methods proposed for
such numbered data may be utilized. These are: intentional
changing sequence of the packets, modifying inter-packet
delays and introducing intentional losses. What is common
to these methods is sender-receiver synchronization require-
ment. We show that for fragmentation process this require-
ment is not longer valid, so the deployment of these methods
is easier—synchronization is not needed because one packet
fragmentation may be treated as one synchronization period.
The lack of requirement for sender-receiver synchronization
makes these methods easier to implement.
Intentional changing sequence of the packets for trans-
mitting covert data was proposed in [16, 17]. These methods
may be applied to IP Fragmentation (F4), especially if the
number of fragments is high by sending fragments in a pre-
defined fashion. In Table 1 four fragments were created and
Fragment Offset values decide of their sequence. So sending
fragments in the sequence 0, 1, 2, 3 may be interpreted as
binary ‘1’ and the reverse order as binary ‘0’.
In general, PRBR of such method depends on number of
fragments (n) and may be expressed as
PRBR = log2 n! [bits/packet] (4.3)
Network steganography method that modifies inter-
packet delay was presented in [18]. Such approach may
be successfully utilized for IP fragmentation (F5) and for
example work as follows. During fragmentation of one IP
packet, fragments are generated at one rate (it may mean
sending hidden binary ‘1’) and while dividing another one
with different rate (e.g. it means sending binary ‘0’).
In general, PRBR of such method depends on number of
packets generation rates (h) and may be expressed as
PRBR = log2 h [bits/packet] (4.4)
Method proposed by Servetto et al. [19] which introduces
intentional losses in numbered stream of packets may be
also utilized. This solution is implemented as skipping one
sequence number at the sender so no user data is lost. Loss
that occurred during fixed time interval is equal to sending
one steganogram bit. This method is called phantom pack-
ets. The same method can be applied to IP fragmentation
(F6). While sender generates fragments, it skips one Frag-
ment Offset value and inserts the user data into next frag-
ment. If the loss of fragment occurs it means sending bi-
nary ‘1’ and if it is not present, binary ‘0’. To work cor-
rectly this method requires modified receiver which can re-
assembly original IP packet even though not all fragments
reached the receiver. We named this modified version of ex-
isting method as phantom fragments.
For presented method steganographic bandwidth equals
PRBR = 1 bit/packet.
4.2 PMTUD
The main idea for exchanging hidden data with PMTUD is
simple—it involves sender to utilize probe messages to carry
steganogram and invoke sending intentional fake ICMP
messages by receiver. Detailed hidden information proce-
dure is suitable for both IPv4 and IPv6 and is possible for
all scenarios from Fig. 4.
Proposed steganographic method works as follows. SS
knows from previous interactions with SR what the correct
MTU for their communication path is. When SS wants to
send steganogram then it sends a probe message that con-
tains steganogram inserted into packet payload. The size of
the packet is set to the maximum MTU allowed for path be-
tween SS and SR, thus SS is certain that this packet will
reach the receiver.
To make the selected packet for steganographic purposes
distinguishable from other yet hard to detect we propose
similar procedure as it was presented for IP fragmentation
mechanism. If we assume that sender and receiver share se-
cret Steg-Key (SK), then for each packet chosen for hid-
den communication a hash function (H ) is used to calculate
Identifying Sequence (IS):
IS = H(SK||Identification||CB) (4.5)
where Identification denotes values from that IP header
field, CB is Control Bit and || is bits concatenation func-
tion. Control Bit is used to inform the receiver whether it
should sent more fake ICMP messages or not (CB = 1 send
more ICMP, CB = 0 do not send more ICMP). For every IP
packet used for hidden communications the resulting IS will
be different due to the changing values from Identification
field. All IS bits or only selected ones are distributed across
payload field in predefined manner.
After a probe message reaches the receiver, he/she cal-
culates two ISs (one for CB = 1, second for CB = 0) based
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on SK and value from the IP header and checks if it con-
tains steganogram or user data. When steganogram is de-
tected it is extracted from the packet payload. If IS calcula-
tion indicates that CB = 1 then receiver intentionally send
ICMP message that indicate that the MTU of the path must
be decreased and thus sender is obligated to send smaller
probe message (which will also contain steganogram). In
fake ICMP message source IP address must be spoofed to
avoid trivial detection. In the payload of ICMP message IP
header of the original packet and 64 bits of original data are
present. Receiver must mark ICMP message to allow sender
to distinguish real ICMP from fake one. To achieve this we
propose to modify the TTL (Time To Live) field of the orig-
inal IP packet header from the ICMP payload and change
the Total Length and Header Checksum values accordingly.
TTL is the only field in IP header (if IP fragmentation is
not used) which may be modified during traversing the net-
work. Thus comparing original packet sent with returned in
ICMP message will not result in easy hidden communica-
tion detection. There are many possibilities of TTL modifi-
cations and, in particular, they include setting TTL to pre-
arranged value or to even/odd one. Functioning of the de-
scribed above steganographic method is also illustrated in
Fig. 8. In this example, during the PMTUD exchange, about
3 kB of steganogram was sent from SS to SR.







where n denotes number of probes sent from sender to re-
ceiver, Pn probe payload size and T connection duration.
During PMTUD exchange all probes messages may be
used for steganographic purposes but in this case detection
may be easier to perform. Because it is assumed that the
earlier probes failed to reach the receiver, next ones should
carry fragment of the same data. Thus, comparing each
probe message sent with the first one issued may be used
Fig. 8 PMTUD steganographic method
to detect steganograms. Only in case when the first probe
is used to carry steganogram above steganographic method
is hard to detect but then the steganographic bandwidth is
limited.
4.3 PLPMTUD
In PLPMTUD probes messages are validated at the trans-
port layer and correct MTU is learned by starting with pack-
ets which size is relatively small and when they get through
they proceed with progressively larger ones. The isolated
loss of a probe packet is treated as an indication of an MTU
limit and transport layer protocol is permitted to retransmit
any missing data. Thus, steganographic method described
for PMTUD is not applicable. Nevertheless, other possibili-
ties for hidden communication may be utilized. One of them
is RSTEG (Retransmission Steganography) method which
is presented by authors in details in [21] and uses inten-
tional retransmissions to sent steganograms. RSTEG main
idea is to not acknowledge a successfully received packet in
order to intentionally invoke retransmission. The retransmit-
ted packet carries a steganogram instead of user data in the
payload field. RSTEG may be used for IPv4 and IPv6 in all
hidden communication scenarios from Fig. 4.
For PLPMTUD using RSTEG works as follows. SS
knows from previous interactions with SR what the correct
MTU for their communication path is. When the connection
starts, SS sends probe message with prearranged MTU. Af-
ter successfully receiving the packet, the receiver intention-
ally does not issue an acknowledgment message. In a normal
situation, a sender is obligated to retransmit the lost packet
when the timeframe within which packet acknowledgement
should have been received expires. In the context of RSTEG,
a sender replaces original payload with a steganogram in-
stead of sending the same packet again. When the retrans-
mitted packet reaches the receiver, he/she can then extract
hidden information.
The detection method is similar to one presented for PM-
TUD and is based on comparing probes messages payload
during MTU learning process.
5 Experimental evaluation for IP fragmentation
steganography
To evaluate the steganographic bandwidth for methods pre-
sented in Sect. 4.1 for IP fragmentation, prototype applica-
tion called StegFrag was implemented. It encloses stegano-
graphic methods F1–F5 except method F6 as it may interfere
with other methods and decrease achievable steganographic
bandwidth. As stated in Sect. 4.1 some of presented method
may be easily detected if used alone. In StegFrag cho-
sen steganographic methods were implemented to achieve
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Fig. 9 Experimental IP fragmentation steganography setup
Table 3 Experimental connections characteristic features
Measure Average Standard deviation
Number of fragments 219698 142.7
Connection time [s] 792.6 7.23




F1 F2 F3 F4 F5
PRBR [bit/packet] 1 0.001 320 6 1
higher steganographic bandwidth yet limit the risk of detec-
tion.
Experimental client-server scenario was set up which is
presented in Fig. 9.
In presented scenario, client A requests and downloads
a 100 MB file from the server B. Both the sender and the
receiver are on LAN, thus their MTU is 1500 bytes. Server
B intentionally sends fragmented packets with MTU equals
740 bytes, thus each original 1500 bytes packet is divided
into three fragments (740, 740 and 60 bytes respectively).
The experiment was repeated 10 times and average results
of these connections are presented in Table 3.
For each steganographic method implemented in
StegFrag, following PRBR was used as presented in Table 4.
For F3 method, if the fake fragment is generated it is always
the third (with highest Fragment Offset) and its payload is
used to carry steganogram (40 bytes, IS included).
Above mentioned steganographic methods were imple-
mented to limit the risk of disclosure. Thus methods F1 and
F3 depend on each other. Each original IP packet is frag-
mented into three pieces so without further modifications
in functioning using method F1 is impossible. That is why
when there is binary ‘0’ in hidden data to send then the
third fragment is assumed to be fake inserted one. Thus, for
method F1 the number of “real” fragments sent is two—
this allows to transmit additional bit of steganogram per one
original IP packet. In other case three “real” fragments are
present and method F3 is not used.
F5 is implemented as follows. Every 1000 packets there
is slight change in next packets sizes to set Fragment Offset
field in last fragment to even/odd value. This allows to em-
bed one steganogram bit per 1000 original IP packets. Such
rare changes were deliberately set to limit the risk of detec-
tion.
For example when there is binary ‘0’ in hidden data to be
sent, steganographic bandwidth provided by methods F1–F5
is a sum of each method steganographic bandwidth. When
binary ‘1’ must be sent steganographic bandwidth is much
lower because it consists only of steganographic bandwidths
from methods F1, F2, F4 and F5.
When fragments reach the at client A, it is extracted in
predefined manner—presence of hidden bits from method
F3 is checked first and extracted, then hidden bit from F1
and methods F4, F5. Last steganogram bit is extracted if it
is possible from method F2.
The actual algorithms in pseudocode for embedding
steganogram at server B and extracting it at client A are
presented below.
Embedding algorithm at server B:
For each Original_IP_packet
{

















If NoOfPackets mod 1000 = 0 then
{






Extraction algorithm at client A:
For each IncomingFragment
{
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}




If NoOfPackets mod 1000 = 0 then
{
If Even(Last_FragmentOffset) = 1 then
ExtractedStegBits ← Insert(0)
else ExtractedStegBits ← Insert(1);
}
}
The following experimental results were obtained (Ta-
ble 5).
During the 100 MB file transfer, 1.54 MB of stegano-
gram, on average, was secretly transferred during the single
connection. It must be noted however, that usable bandwidth
due to fake fragments detection with IS sequence is slightly
lower and is about 1.25 MB. This is large amount of secret
data sent during nearly 13.5 minutes connection with limited
risk of detection. Figures 10 and 11 illustrate PRBR and cu-
mulative total steganogram sent during the fragment of the
exemplary connection respectively.
Due to F3 method functioning and its PRBR, average
connection PRBR is changing dynamically during the con-
nection (Fig. 10). The same cause is responsible for the
shape of the total steganogram curve (Fig. 11).
In Table 6 fraction of the total steganographic bandwidth
for each of implemented methods is presented. It can be
seen that about 95% of total steganographic bandwidth is
provided by method F3, which is not surprising considering
their PRBRs.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we presented potential steganographic methods
that can be used for mechanisms for handling oversized IP
packets: IP fragmentation, PMTUD and PLPMTUD. In par-
ticular, we propose two new steganographic methods, three
extensions of existing ones and we show how IP fragmenta-
tion simplifies utilizing steganographic solutions which re-
quire transmitter-receiver synchronization.
Proposed steganographic methods are characterized by
different steganographic bandwidth and detection possibil-
ities, thus they can have various impact on network security.
Knowledge of these information hiding procedures can now
be utilized to develop and implement countermeasures for
network traffic monitoring. This may limit the risk of confi-
dential information leakage or other threats caused by covert
communication.
Table 5 Experimental results
Measure Average Standard deviation
Total amount of covert
data sent [bits]
12302478 7991.62
RBR [bit/s] 15517.5 141.9
Table 6 Steganographic bandwidth fraction [%] per steganographic
method
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5
Steganographic
bandwidth fraction [%]
0.6 0.0006 95.23 3.57 0.6
Fig. 10 PRBR for fragment of the exemplary connection
Fig. 11 Cumulative total steganogram sent during the fragment of the
exemplary connection
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Experimental results for IP fragmentation achieved with
prototype application showed that, while downloading 100
MB file, in about 13 minutes connection, one is able to send
more than 1 MB of hidden data with limited risk of detec-
tion. These results urge to develop and deploy suitable ste-
ganalysis tools in every network that should be secure.
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